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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Appeal
The New York State Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the Court of

Appeals and authorizes appeal by permission.' New York Civil Practice Act §589
supplements this by providing:
"Appeal to the court of appeals lies only
(1) by permission of the appellate division, and not otherwise,
(a) from a judgment or order of the appellate division
which does not finally determine the action or special
proceeding in which it is entered..."
An Appellate Division order which reverses an order vacating a final judgment
and denies the motion is not a final order. An appeal therefrom does not lie as of
right, but only by permission of the Appellate Division.2 But where the motion to
vacate is made by a person not previously a party, this is a separate proceeding
which results in a final order, and appeal is a matter of right.a
4
These rules were reiterated in ArbitrationBetween Republique F., Etc. The
case involved proceedings in the matter of arbitration of questions arising out of
contracts between the French government and an Illinois corporation. From an
order of the Appellate Division 5 which unanimously reversed on the law an order
of the Special Term,8 the moving parties appealed. The latter court had granted a
motion by the corporation and its sole stockholder, appearing specially, to vacate
an order confirming an arbitrator's award and the judgment thereon. The Appellate Division, denying the motion, directed reinstatement of the judgment. The

Court of Appeals after a discussion of questions involving constitutional due
process, corporations and corporate survival statutes reinstated the order of the
Special Term. It was decided that the arbitration procedure was a nullity because
France did not give the corporation "a reasonable opportunity to be heard" in
accordance with their agreement and constitutional due process.7 In the instant
case, defendant mailed notice of demand for arbitration to the corporation. This
was returned by the post office with the notation "out of business." At the
close of arbitration proceedings attended only by the defendant, notice of
motion to confirm the award was sent to the same address as the previous notice.
This did not give the Supreme Court in personam jurisdiction over the corporation. The court therefore held the corporation was a third party for the purpose of
1. N. Y. CoNsT. art. VI §7 (4, 5, 6).
2. See COHEN AND KARGER, PowERS OF THE N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS, (2nd ed.

1952), p. 143 and cases there cited.
3. U. S.Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Bingham, 301 N. Y. 1, 92 N. E. 2d 39 (1950); Matter
of Burda7, 288 N. Y. 606, 42 N. E. 2d 608 (1942).
4. 309 N. Y. 269, 128 N. E. 2d 750 (1955).
5. 284 App. Div. 699, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 470 (1st Dep't, 1954).
6. 124 N. Y. S. 2d 93 (1953).
7. DeDooel v. PuTZman Co., 57 F. 2d 171 (1932); Grover & Baker Sewing Maoh.
Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287 (1890).
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the finality rule and appeal was of right. This decision extends the third party
finality rule to one named as a party to an action or proceeding but over whose
person no jurisdiction has been obtained even though he was the only party
named.
The three dissenters were of the opinion that the notice of the proceedings
had been given to the corporation by virtue of a demand for arbitration sent to its
sole stockholder and that the notice of motion to confirm the award complied with
both their agreement and New York Civil Practice Act §1461. They therefore
concluded the corporation was a party and appeal lay only by permission; since this
had not been obtained they would have dismissed.

Corporation as a Citizen

The Constitution of New York State declares that timber in the Forest
Preserve shall not be "sold, removed or destroyed."8 In a proceeding under section
4 of that article9 for permission to institute a suit to restrain the Conservation
Commissioner from contracting for cutting blown-down timber in the Preserve,
on the ground that the statute10 authorizing such contracts is unconstitutional, it
was held, for purposes of bringing suit to enjoin violations of that portion of the
Constitution the petitioner membership corporation is a citizen within the meaning
of that clause. 1
This decision was based on the finding by the Court that there is no absolute and inflexible rule that a corporation, especially a membership Corporation,
may not be deemed a citizen for various purposes. 12 The Appellant's contention
that a corporation has no justiciable interest that makes it an appropriate champion of constitutional principles was shown by the Court to be of no weight, in
that the issue is whether or not the plaintiff has a justiciable interest in the controversy rather than whether or not it is a corporation. This is apparent from the
cases which have upheld the right of a membership corporation to sue for the
8. N. Y. CONST. art. XIV, §1.
9. Violations of Article-How Restrained: ". .. or with the consent of the

Supreme Court Appellate Division, on notice to the attorney general at the suit

of any citizen." (emphasis supplied).
10. N. Y. Conservation Law §250 (36).
11. Oneida County Forest Preserve Council v. Wehle, 309 N. Y. 152, 128 N. E.
2d 282 (1955).
12. Anglo-American Provision*Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 169 N. Y. 506, 62
N. E. 587 (1902); Fire Department v. Stanton, 28 App. Div. 334 51 N. Y. Supp.
242 (1st Dept. 1898); Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturer's Finance Co., 264 U. S.
182 (1924).

